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Abstract
Almost all African countries are planning to increase
their power supply capacities and to diversify the
resource base of the electricity sector. In sharp con-
trast to the ambitious objectives, grid connected
power plants, based on renewable energies, are
very rare except large scale hydropower in African
countries. The small number of renewable energy
(RE)-plants in Africa shows that a quick diffusion of
these technologies cannot be expected from the
dynamic of market forces alone. Political support is
necessary. By now, feed-in tariffs (FIT) is the most
prominent economic instrument promoting renew-
able energy technologies in the power sector. They
are applied in more than 50 countries, among them
several African countries like Algeria, Kenya,
Uganda, Ghana and Tanzania. The objective of the
paper is to investigate the outcome and effective-
ness of African FIT-schemes. It is assumed that most
of the FIT-schemes in Africa are poorly working
because of unfavourable institutional design, insuf-
ficient level of FIT rates or obstacles in the process
of implementation. Deficiencies in the design of FIT-
schemes and the implementation process can be
explained by conflicting policy targets like afford-
able power prices and grid stability but also with an
unclear allocation of property rights that can lead to
time-consuming negotiations of Power Purchase
Agreements. 
Keywords: renewable energies; instruments to pro-
mote renewable energies; Feed-In Tariffs; grid-
access; institutions; 
1. Introduction
Almost all African countries are planning to increase
their power supply capacities and to diversify the
resource base of the electricity sector. According to
official programs and planning (National Resource
Plans, White papers etc.) modern renewable energy
technologies, especially solar power plants, shall
play an important role to meet these targets. In
sharp contrast to these ambitious objectives, grid
connected power plants, based on renewable ener-
gies except large scale hydro power, are very rare in
African countries. In the absence of solid figures it is
estimated that in 2012 the total number of RE
power plants in Africa is less than 1000, compared
to 1.1 million in Germany. Furthermore, it is sug-
gested that the total capacity of grid connected solar
power plants in Africa is less than 20 MW, com-
pared to say about 25 000 MW in Germany.
The small number of RE-plants in Africa shows
that a quick diffusion of these technologies cannot
be expected from the dynamics of market forces
alone. Political support is necessary. 
For promoting renewable energies in the elec-
tricity industry, several instruments are available
such as subsidies, quotas, tendering and feed-in tar-
iffs. As theoretical discussion shows, each instru-
ment has specific strengths and weaknesses,
depending on the targets of energy policy. If it
comes to promoting the technological development
of a bundle of different renewable technologies,
FITs are the most appropriate instrument. On the
other hand, if energy policy targets to increase the
share of renewable energies in the power sector at
least cost quota systems or tendering seem to be
more appropriate. Thirdly, if the major policy objec-
tive is mitigation of greenhouse gases, the promo-
tion of specific renewable energy technologies
might be reasonable. Finally, if job creation is the
dominant target, subsidies for specific renewable
energy technologies might be superior to other
approaches. In the real world, policies have several
objectives and thus, a mix of different instruments is
applied simultaneously or the FIT-scheme is modi-
fied to make it compatible with other policy targets,
especially the target of affordable power prices. 
By now, the FIT is the most prominent econom-
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ic instrument to promote renewable energy tech-
nologies in the power sector. FITs were first applied
in industrialized countries like Germany and Spain,
but by now are applied in more than 50 countries,
among them several developing countries. Even
several African countries like Algeria, Kenya,
Uganda and Tanzania have introduced them; other
countries like Ghana, Botswana and Namibia are
considering doing so. In 2011, South Africa prema-
turely abandoned FITs for a competitive bidding
process, despite having introduced favourable FIT
rates.1 The outcome and effectiveness of African
FIT schemes is not systematically investigated, yet. 
The paper aims to describe and evaluate FIT
schemes of a number of African countries. It is
assumed that most of the FIT schemes in Africa are
poorly working because of unfavourable institution-
al design, insufficient level of FIT rates or obstacles
in the process of implementation. Further it is
assumed that these design and implementation
deficits don’t occur accidentally, but are expressing
conflicting policy targets like affordable power
prices and stability of the power grid.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2
the criteria that can be used to evaluate FIT-
schemes is discussed. Section 3 presents the fea-
tures of the FIT-systems in relevant African countries
and evaluates them according to the criteria dis-
cussed in section 2. Section 4 summarizes the rele-
vant results.
2. Criteria for the evaluation of FIT-schemes
FITs were introduced first by industrialized countries
to meet a broad bundle of political targets like:
• developing new renewable energy technologies
and bringing down the cost of green power gen-
eration,
• increasing the share of green power in the elec-
tricity market,
• contributing to the mitigation of GHG, and
• creating new job opportunities, especially in
rural areas.
To meet these objectives, a FIT scheme must be
designed in a way, that it is attracting national and
international investors. That means the tariff must
be high enough to cover the generation cost of a
given technology, including a sufficient rate of
return and supplements for technology and country
risks. 
From investors’ perspective, the ideal FIT
scheme shows the following design elements: 
• it includes a broad bundle of green technologies;
• the tariffs is based on cost of generation;
• the tariffs are differentiated by technology;
• the tariffs are differentiated by size or application
for each technology;
• the tariffs are differentiated by resource intensity
for wind energy and solar;
• the tariff is provided for a number of years, suf-
ficient to recover all costs;
• the tariff is indexed by inflation;
• there are no program caps; and
• there are no project size caps (minimum or max-
imum project size).
Furthermore, access of green power suppliers to
the grid – to the transmission grid or to the distribu-
tion grid – is crucial. The grid company must be
obliged to connect renewable power plants to the
grid and to accept the (fluctuating) green power
supply with priority. This obligation affects the grid
company in many ways (e.g. need for balancing
power) and implies a reallocation of property rights
in favour of green power suppliers.
Ideally, from a green power supplier’s perspec-
tive, the grid company2 is facing the following obli-
gations:  
• it has to ensure grid connection within a defined
time span;
• it is bearing the cost of grid connection and grid
enhancement;
• it has to accept all renewable power supplied
without restrictions concerning timing and quan-
tities;
• it has to provide additional balancing power;
and
• it has to pay the defined FIT for each kWh sup-
plied even if it is not entitled to pass all cost to
the final customers.
Under such a ‘green regime’ there is no need for
power purchase agreements (PPA) between the
green power supplier and the grid company. This is
the case in Germany where no PPA is required. This
regime, while diluting the grid company’s property
rights, implies the risk of grid disturbances and even
of divestments in the grid infrastructure. This disad-
vantage of a green regime can be avoided if the grid
company is financially compensated; meaning that
all program costs can be passed to the final cos-
tumers.3
The ideal FIT scheme, added by an ideal ‘green’
regime of grid access, is based on two pillars:
• strong public support of green power and accep-
tance of the people to bear increases of power
prices; and
• existence of sufficient grid capacity to connect a
significant number of green power producers
without the threat of destabilizing the grid.
In developing countries, theses pillars of a well-
designed FIT scheme cannot be taken for granted.
On the contrary, in most developing countries,
power prices for the domestic sector represent a
sensible political issue. Often power prices for pri-
vate households are subsidized to make power
affordable. This is true especially for Africa, where
the power prices are much higher than in develop-
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ing countries in other continents (Eberhard et al.,
2011). Another critical feature of the African elec-
tricity sector is the lack of grid capacity.
As a consequence, it is expected that the FIT
scheme and the grid access regime cannot be
implemented in a way that may be appropriate for
affluent industrialized countries. Instead, modifica-
tions are expected, to limit the impacts on power
prices and to make the feed-in of green power com-
patible with the weak grid infrastructure.
To avoid increasing power prices, Governments
can apply different strategies, like: 
• Program caps to limit the total share of renew-
able energies in the power sector and thus to
limit the additional cost for the customers,
• Technology caps to limit the share of technolo-
gies with comparatively high specific cost and
high variability like wind energy and
• Minimum sizes to exclude small plants with rela-
tively high specific cost.
Some of these strategies are applied in industrial-
ized countries, too.
Furthermore, different approaches can be distin-
guished to make the FIT program compatible to
the requirements of grid stabilization, like:
• The proposed projects must be in line with the
investment priorities of a published Master Plan
for the power sector.4
• The compatibility of the proposed project with
the requirements of grid stabilization is defined
by the grid company. 
• The conditions of grid access (timing, cost of
grid connection and grid enhancements etc.) are
left to negotiations between the grid company;
and the green power supplier. 
In the latter case, it is expected that a Purchase
Power Agreement (PPA) will only be signed if both
parties agree upon all relevant issues. In this case,
all relevant property rights remain in the hands of
the grid company. The approach is therefore
referred to as the ‘grey regime’ of grid access. Under
such a regime, the grid company is not likely to
allow grid access unless if it is meeting its interests
e.g. if decentralized green power supply helps to
avoid bottlenecks or leads to cost reductions (e.g.
by reducing power losses or avoiding power out-
ages). Under the grey regime, serious implementa-
tion issues are expected, in spite of favourable FITs.
Implementation issues are expected to become
even more serious if the grid company is vertically
integrated and has its own generation branch. In
this case, the grid company does not only defend
the profitability of the grid, but tries to avoid
‘stranded cost’ caused by unused capacities of con-
ventional generation capacities. Again, the imple-
mentation issues can be reduced if the regulatory
body ensures that the additional cost of the FIT
regime can be passed to the final customers.
3. Features of FIT schemes of African
countries
In the following section, the features of FIT schemes
in a number of African countries are described and
analysed. Under consideration are countries with
working FIT schemes including more than one type
of renewable energy technology.5 In analysing the
FIT schemes, focus is given to the favourable and
unfavourable aspects from an international
investor’s perspective. Favourable are institutions
that are increasing incentives for investments in
renewable energy plants. Unfavourable are institu-
tions that reduce the scope for investments and
increase transaction cost and risks.
Algeria
The Government of Algeria intends to increase the
share of renewable energies in the power mix. The
first program was passed 2004, but without detailed
targets. In the recently published ‘Renewable
Energy and Energy Efficiency Program’ of March
2011 (Ministre de l’Energie et des Mines, 2011) the
Government formulates the ambitious objective’…
of installing up to 22 000 MW of power generating
capacity from renewable sources between 2011 and
2030…and it is expected that about 40% of elec-
tricity produced for domestic consumption will be
from renewable energy sources by 2030’ (Ministre
de l’Energie et des Mines, 2011: 4).
The Algerian government instituted a FIT-
scheme by decree, No.04-92 of March 2004 (Décret
executive), after power shortages and rationing of
electricity in mid-2003. The target of the decree is
diversification of electricity generation by using
renewable energies and cogeneration. When pub-
lished in 2004 Algeria was the first African country
that had introduced a FIT-scheme. The main fea-
tures are the following:
• FITs are offered for the following renewable
energies used for power generation: wind,
waste, hydro and solar (photovoltaic - PV and
concentrated solar power - CSP). There are no
special prices for specific technologies;
• The FIT – published in law - are not based on
cost of generation, but bonuses or premium
prices (see Table 1);
• The tariffs are not differentiated by technology,
but by energy;
• Tariffs are not differentiated by size or applica-
tion for each technology;
• Tariffs for wind are not differentiated by wind-
speed;
• The FIT is offered for a project’s lifetime;
• There is no explicit inflation indexing. But since
the FIT is based on retail power prices, a gener-
al cost increase will lead to increasing tariffs; 
• Program caps do not exist; and
• Project size caps do not exist for renewable
power plants, but only for cogeneration plants.
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The decree does not provide fixed tariffs but
defines energy-specific bonuses or premiums that
are paid on top of the market price, defined by law
No.° 02-01 du 22 Dhou El Kaada 1422 (Articles 88
ff). The market price is identical to the retail price
including generation cost, transmission cost, distri-
bution cost, marketing cost and diversification cost.
Electricity producers using renewable energies ben-
efit from premiums between 100% and 300% of the
market price of electricity, guaranteed for the full
lifetime of a project. 
Table 1: Premium for renewable energies and
cogeneration in Algeria
Renewable energy Premium on the 
market price
Wind power 300%
Hydro power 100%
Cogeneration 160%
Waste incineration 200%
Solar electricity entirely produced by
solar irradiation (PV or CSP without 
co-generation) 300%
For solar thermal electricity with gas co-generation
the bonus is 
for a solar contribution greater than 25% 200%
for a solar contribution of 20% to 25% 180%
for a solar contribution of 15% to 20% 160%
for a solar contribution of 10% to 15% 140%
for a solar contribution of 5% to 10% 100%
for a solar contribution of 0% to 5% 0%
The main institutions of grid access are the fol-
lowing:
• The national grid company Sonelgaz has the
obligation to allow third parties the access to the
transmission grid;
• The law does not include a ‘priority rule’ for
renewable energies;
• New power plants have to be authorized by the
Ministry of Energy or by the national regulator
(Commission de regulation de l’electricité et du
gaz, CREG). Exceptions exist only for power
plants that are producing for the generator’s
own demand or that are smaller than 25 MW,
and 
• There is no obligation of the grid company
(Sonelgaz) to upgrade the grid infrastructure
(Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment
and Energy, CREAD, 2010).
What are the pros and cons of the Algerian FIT
scheme from an investor’s perspective? 
Positive features are the following:
• FITs are provided for a broad bundle of renew-
able energies (not for specific technologies);
• FITs are provided for the lifetime of a project;
• No program caps;
• No project capacity caps; and
• Obligation for grid-company to connect green
power suppliers.
Unfavourable features of the Algerian FIT
scheme that are leading to higher transaction costs
or increasing uncertainty are the following:
• Since the FIT is a bonus on the retail price of
power, it varies with the power price implying
uncertainty in revenue streams for the green
energy supplier. Furthermore, subsidies for
power stations (subsidies for natural gas) lead to
a decrease of retail prices for power and thus
reduce the profitability of renewable energy
technologies;
• FITs are not differentiated by technology, size
and location;
• The Tariff is expressed in national currency not
US$ or € implying exchange rate risks for for-
eign investors;
• There is no obligation for the grid company to
feed in green power with priority (no priority
rule);
• Unclear rules as to who shall bear the cost of
grid connection and grid enhancement; and
• No obligation for the grid company to enhance
grid-infrastructure.
In conclusion, one can say that both the design
of the tariff and the grid access rules imply serious
risks for investors. The FIT is not fixed, but is
depending on variable and subsidized power tariffs.
The grid access regime can rather be referred to as
a `grey regime’ than a green regime. A lot of impor-
tant issues such as cost of grid connection, grid
enhancement and the timing of feeding in green
power are left to negotiations between the grid
company and the green power supplier. Since the
grid company has a generation branch it is expect-
ed that they will be reluctant to accept the supply of
green power from independent power producers.
The Algerian energy policy, characterized by
insufficient FITs and regulatory obstacles, obviously
attempts to promote renewable energies without
increasing power prices and without endangering
the financial stability of the national grid company.
Authorization of new power plants and lacking pro-
visions to avoid bottlenecks in the grid is protecting
the incumbent power generator (Sonelgaz) against
stranded cost and the grid company (Sonelgaz)
against rising costs. Since these costs have to be
passed to final costumers in one way or the other,
the provisions help to avoid rising power prices. 
Thus, it is no wonder that the outcome of the
FIT scheme is poor. There is no indication that any
project has been initiated and realized by the FIT-
scheme. The ambitious objectives mentioned will
hardly be realized with help of the existing FIT-
scheme. The recently published ‘Renewable Energy
Journal of Energy in Southern Africa  • Vol 24 No 1  •  February 2013 59
and Energy Efficiency Program’ of March 2011
does not even mention the FIT-scheme as a relevant
instrument. Instead, the focus is on subsidies to
cover the additional cost of (large) renewable power
plants. In conclusion, one can say that the Algerian
FIT-scheme is not working because of the insuffi-
cient level and the variability of tariffs. Since the tar-
iff is insufficient, other issues like obstacles to grid
access do not become visible.
Ghana
The Ghanaian FIT scheme is still at an early stage
of implementation. The objective of the ‘Renewable
Energy Bill’, that was passed 2011, is to support the
development, utilization and efficient management
of renewable energy sources. ‘…Government faces
the challenge to increase renewable energy in the
national energy mix in a sustainable manner. Its
goal is to increase the proportion of renewable
energy, particularly solar, wind, mini hydro and
waste-to-energy in the national energy supply mix
and to contribute to the mitigation of climate
change. ‘ (Republic of Ghana: Renewable Energy
Bill, 2011:1). 
The main features of the Ghanaian FIT-scheme
are the following:
• FITs are offered for a great number of renewable
energies used for power generation: wind,
hydro, solar (PV and CSP), biomass, bio-fuel,
landfill and sewage gas, municipal solid waste,
industrial waste, geothermal energy, ocean ener-
gy, other energy sources (as designated by the
Minister). The tariffs will be expressed in US$;
• In principal, the FIT is based on cost of genera-
tion, but other aspects like impact on power
prices have to be considered as well. The tariff
level is not published in law, but shall be pub-
lished by the Public Utility Regulation
Commission. Experts expect the FIT for PV to
range between USD 0.20 and 0.25 per kWh; 
• The tariffs shall consider the technology under
consideration;
• The law does not make statements whether the
tariff shall be differentiated by size;
• Tariffs shall consider the location of renewable
power generation;
• The FIT is guaranteed for 10 years. ‘The feed-in-
tariff rate fixed for electricity from renewable
energy sources shall be guaranteed for a period
of ten years and subsequently be subject to
review every two years’ (§28 (Wuppertal
Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy,
CREAD, 2010).
• There is no explicit inflation indexing;  it can be
considered after ten years; 
• A program cap does not exist; and
• Project size caps do not exist, neither minimum
sizes nor maximum sizes
Implicitly, caps concerning the maximum aggre-
gate plant capacity for a single technology or for all
renewable energy technologies can come into the
picture, since Renewable Energy Law is combining
the FIT-scheme with another instrument, a renew-
able energy purchase obligation for distribution
companies. Distribution companies as well as so
called bulk customers have to cover a specified per-
centage of their energy demand by renewable ener-
gies.
The main institutions of grid access are the fol-
lowing:
• Grid companies have the obligation to connect
renewable energy generators to the  transmis-
sion or distribution grid;
• The law includes a purchase obligation but no
explicit ‘priority rule’ for renewable energies.
The PPA has to be in accordance to guidelines
published by the Regulation Board;
• Renewable power generators need to be
licensed. The license can be refused for many
reasons like technical data, national security,
public safety, food security, health and environ-
mental safety; and
• The law does not include any regulations as to
who is going to bear the cost of grid connection
and grid enhancements.
What are the pros and cons of the Ghanaian FIT
scheme from an investor’s perspective? 
Positive features are the following:
• FITs are provided for a comprehensive bundle of
renewable energies (not for specific technolo-
gies);
• FIT will be expressed in US$;
• The tariff shall consider the type of technology
and the location of renewable power plants;
• There are no program caps;
• There are no project capacity caps, neither min-
imum caps, nor maximum caps;
• Obligation on grid companies to connect green
power suppliers and to purchase the power;
Unfavourable features of the Ghanaian FIT
scheme that are leading to higher transaction costs
or increasing uncertainty are the following:
• The FITs – though not yet published - are guar-
anteed for 10 years only. The tariff level after ten
years is subject of future policy decision making;
• The FIT is not strictly based on cost of genera-
tion, but other aspects like impact on power
prices may be considered as well; 
• There is no explicit inflation indexing - it can be
considered after ten years;
• There is no obligation for the grid company to
feed in green power with priority (no priority
rule);
• Unclear rules on who shall bear the cost of grid
connection and grid enhancement;
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• Renewable power generators need to be
licensed. The license can be refused for many
reasons; and 
• There is no obligation for the grid company to
enhance grid-infrastructure.
It can therefore be concluded that the Ghanaian
FIT scheme shows some favourable design ele-
ments like FITs expressed in US$ and the lack of
program and capacity caps. At the same time there
are, however, several unfavourable features that
lead to uncertainty and may jeopardize profitability
and bankability. It is still too early for a final conclu-
sion since neither the tariffs nor the guidelines for
PPA have been published. Furthermore, experi-
ences concerning the process of licensing are lack-
ing. In general it can be said that if the licenses are
not granted according to a standardized process
with defined timing, it may imply detrimental
impacts on the process of project implementation.
Publishing of guidelines can help to speed up the
process of negotiation, if they clarify the (property)
rights of the green energy supplier. 
The fact, that the tariffs are not yet published
indicates the relevance of target conflicts, promoting
renewable energy in the power sector without
increasing the power price level. If the tariff will be
too low, not the FIT-scheme, the Renewable Power
Purchase obligation will be effective. In this case,
the FIT-scheme will be replaced by a quota-system.
Kenya
To increase the electricity supply and to diversify the
electricity energy sources, the Government of
Kenya introduced a REFIT scheme in 2008. The
general objectives of the REFIT system are both,
macroeconomic (income and employment genera-
tion) and energy economic (contribution to supply
and diversification of electricity generation sources
[6, p.3]. The Kenyan FIT-scheme was revised 2010.
Besides higher tariffs for wind and biogas the
revised version includes tariffs for biomass, geother-
mal and solar resources (Ministry of Energy, 2010). 
The main features of the Kenyan FIT-scheme are
the following:
• FITs are offered for the following renewable
energies used for power generation: wind,
biomass, small hydro, biogas, geothermal, solar
(PV and CSP); 
• The tariffs are expressed in US$;
• The calculation of the FITs is principally based
on the generation cost of renewable power
plants; but other factors like avoided cost and
international FIT-levels will be considered too; 
• The FITs of the Kenyan scheme are not mini-
mum tariffs that must be paid by the Grid
Company, but maximum tariffs that must not be
exceeded. The supplier and the grid company
may agree upon lower tariffs (Ministry of
Energy, 2010); 
• Different tariffs are offered for firm and non-firm
power (electricity from sources with fluctuating
supply);
• Tariffs are not differentiated by plant-size, except
for hydro (see Table 2);
• Tariffs for wind, solar etc. are not differentiated
by location;
• The FIT is offered for a period of 20 years;
• There is no inflation indexing;  
• A general program cap does not exist, but caps
for every technology; and
• There are defined project size caps – minimum
and maximum caps – for each technology
(Table 3).
In the case of solar power, there is one FIT pro-
vided for both, solar PV and Concentrating Solar
Power (CSP). For both technologies, the minimum
size is 500 kW. Thus, in case of PV there is a focus
on large ground based plants and not on small (top-
of-roof) plants. ‘Small scale solar PV does not meet
expressed policy goals of rapidly scaling up power
availability with low cost electricity’ (GTZ,
2009:16).
The main features of grid access are the follow-
ing:
• Grid companies have the obligation to connect
renewable energy generators to the transmission
or distribution grid;
• The law includes a purchase obligation with
explicit ‘priority rule’ for renewable energies.
‘Power Producers and grid system operators
may agree by contract to digress from the prior-
ity of purchases, if the plant can thus be better
integrated into the grid system. The parties shall
seek approval for such variations from the
Energy Regulatory Commission’ (Ministry of
Energy, 2010:13);
• Renewable power projects need to be approved
in a complex procedure. Firstly, a Letter of
Interest (LOI) has to be submitted and
approved. Once it is approved, a ‘detailed pro-
posal’ must be submitted. ‘Investors whose EOIs
are approved will be required to carry out
detailed feasibility studies including environ-
mental and social impact assessments and sub-
mit detailed proposals. Detailed proposals
should be considered as the business plans of
the investors and should therefore be detailed
enough and be presented in a bankable format’
(Ministry of Energy, 2010.6); 
• The law clearly defines that cost of grid connec-
tion and grid enhancement has to be paid by the
grid company and shall be transferred to final
customers; and
• The cost of the FIT-scheme cannot completely
be transferred to the final customers. About one
third of the program cost has to be borne by the
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grid operator. The grid operator is entitled to
‘…recover from the electricity consumer 70% of
the portion of the Feed-in-Tariff except for solar
which will be 85%, or as maybe directed by the
Energy Regulatory Commission…’ (Ministry of
Energy, 2010:12). 
What are the pros and cons of the Kenyan FIT
scheme from an investor’s perspective? 
Positive features are the following:
• FITs are provided for a comprehensive bundle of
renewable energies (not for specific technolo-
gies);
• FIT are expressed in US$;
• Attractive level of FIT for wind and firm solar;
• The tariff is offered for a period of 20 years;
• A general program cap does not exist; generous
caps exist for every single technology;
• There are defined project size caps – minimum
and maximum caps – for each technology (
Table 3);
• Grid companies have the obligation to connect
renewable energy generators to the transmission
or distribution grid;
• The law includes a purchase obligation with
explicit ‘priority rule’ for renewable energies;
and  
• Costs of grid connection and grid enhancement
have to be paid by the grid company and shall
be transferred to final customers.
Unfavourable features of the Kenyan FIT
scheme that are leading to higher transaction costs
or increasing uncertainty are the following:
• The FITs are maximum prices not minimum
prices. The grid company may try negotiating
lower prices; 
• Very low tariffs for non-firm electricity make
investments in PV technologies extremely
unattractive;
• The FIT is not only based on generation cost of
renewable power plants, but other aspects like
avoided cost and international FIT levels have
to be considered as well; 
• The grid company is not entitled to recover all
cost of the FIT scheme. Incomplete recovering of
the cost may reduce its capability to follow other
economic objectives like grid stabilization and
rural electrification.
• There is no explicit inflation indexing; and
• Renewable power projects need to be approved
in a complex process.
Evaluating the Kenyan FIT-scheme we see both
institutional design elements that promote invest-
ments in renewable power projects, as well as detri-
mental rules. With regard to the grid access rules the
Kenyan FIT scheme shows a lot of favourable fea-
tures and thus tends to be a green regime. On the
other hand, the design of the FIT scheme itself
shows several features that lead to increased uncer-
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Table 2: Feed-in-tariffs in Kenya
Technology type Plant capacity Maximum firm power tariff Maximum non-firm power
(MW)  (US$/kWh) at the  tariff (US$/kWh) at the 
interconnectio point nterconnection point
Geothermal up to 70 0.085
Wind 0.5–100 0.12 0.12
Biomass 0.5–100 0.08 0.06
Small Hydro 0.5–0.99 0.12 0.10
1–5.0 0.10 0.08
5.1–10 0.08 0.06
Biogas 0.5–40 0.08 0.06
Solar 0.5–10 0.20 0.10
Table 3: Capacity caps for firm and non-firm generation
Technology type Plant capacity Cap for firm capacity Cap for non-firm capacity
(MW) (MW) (MW)
Geothermal up to 70 700
Wind 0.5–100 300
Biomass 0.5–100 200 50
Small Hydro 0.5–0.99
1.00–5.0 150 50
5.1–10.0
Biogas 0.5–40 100 50
Solar 0.5–10 100 50
tainties and may impede investments.
The target conflict between promoting renew-
able energies and stability of power prices leads to
some interesting modification of the FIT-scheme:
The FIT-tariff is a maximum tariff, not a guaranteed
tariff. The tariff itself is subject to negotiations
between the grid company and the investor. This
feature impedes project planning and bankability,
since future revenues are subject to uncertainty.6
Since the grid company may not pass all FIT cost to
the final consumers, but only 70% (85%) it has a
strong incentive to negotiate the tariff and to avoid
all kind of projects that lead to significant profit
reductions. 
Possible target conflicts between increasing the
share of renewable energies and grid stability can
lead to exception from the priority role. Even if the
Regulator has to approve any exception the
investor is facing another source of insecurity that
may impede implementation and increase financ-
ing cost. The question on how far these design ele-
ments of the Kenyan FIT-scheme may lead to seri-
ous impediments for green power projects depends
very much on the behaviour of the Regulator and
the Ministry of Energy.
Kenya is the only African country where data on
the impacts of the FIT-scheme is available. By
spring 2011, the FIT policy has elicited 49 expres-
sions of interest (EOI) from potential investors, most
of them for wind power plants (23) and hydro
power projects (19) (Republic of Kenya, 2011). The
received proposals include a capacity of about 1
500 MW, of which 1 311 MW were approved, most
of them being wind power. If all these projects were
implemented the Kenyan generation capacity
would be doubled. But by now, only for 2 projects
have had their PPAs have been signed so far. The
other projects are undertaking feasibility studies
(Republic of Kenya, 2011). Since the agreement on
PPA is subject to negotiations, it is too early to judge
the Kenyan FIT-scheme as a success story. Despite
the fact that the design of the Kenyan FIT- scheme
does include several exceptions from best practice
recommendations, it can be considered as one of
the most promising schemes in Africa. Since the
South-African FIT-scheme has been abandoned in
2011, Kenya has the model role for implementation
of FIT-schemes in Africa.
Uganda
Uganda was among the first African countries to
introduce a FIT-scheme. In 2007, the Government
got a mandate for feed-in tariffs through by the
nation’s 2007 Renewable Energy Policy. ‘The over-
all objective of the Renewable Energy Policy is to
diversify the energy supply sources and technolo-
gies in the country. In particular, the policy goal is to
increase the use of modern new renewable energy
from the current 4% to 61% of the total energy con-
sumption by the year 2017’ [9, p.7]. The FIT-
scheme is a relevant instrument to realize this target
by attracting international investments into the
power sector (Electricity Regulatory Authority,
2011/2). 
The main features of the Ugandan FIT-scheme
are the following:
• FIT are offered for the following renewable ener-
gies used for power generation: Hydro, biogas-
es, biomass, biogas, landfill gas, geothermal,
wind and PV solar (PV and CSP);
• The FITs are based on levelised cost of genera-
tion;
• The tariffs are not differentiated by technology,
but by energy;
• Except from hydro, the tariffs are not differenti-
ated by plant-size; 
• Tariffs for wind are not differentiated by wind-
speed;
• There is an explicit inflation indexing for the
variable cost; 
• The FIT is offered for 20 years;
• Program caps exist for each technology; and
• Project size caps exist (20 MW); in the case of
greater projects the feed-in price is subject to
negotiations.
The Uganda FIT programme explicitly distin-
guishes Priority 1 and Priority 2 projects. Technol-
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Table 4: Received and approved proposals under the Kenyan FIT scheme
Received proposals Approved proposals
Technology type No. Capacity (MW) % of total No. Capacity (MW)
1 Wind 2 1 118 74 20 1 008
2 Biomass 164 11 4 164
3 Hydro 4 111 7 16 81
4 Geothermal 19 70 5 0 0
5 Biogas 1 40 3 1 40
6 Cogeneration 1 18 1 1 18
49 1 521 100 42 1 311
ogies that fall under Priority 1 technologies are
those ‘…for which the Levelised Cost is below or
close to the Avoided Cost’, whereas technologies
with levelised cost ‘…significantly above the
Avoided Cost’ are referred to as Priority 2 projects’
(ERA, 2011:5). In case of Priority 2, the annual
allowable installed capacities are limited. Currently,
all technologies listed in Table 4 are Priority 1 tech-
nologies. The only Priority 2 technology is solar PV.
The selection of Priority 1 and Priority 2 projects
is based on different rules. Whereas the former
‘…will be awarded up to the Maximum Technology
Capacity Limits on a first come first served basis’
the latter will be awarded up to the Maximum
Technology Capacity Limits of Table 4 ‘...through
an annual open bidding process’ (ERA, 2011:8),
based on the following criteria:
• Initial pre-qualification;
• Acceptance of the approved standardized power
purchase agreement;
• Contribution to grid stabilization and mitigation
of transmission losses;
• Promotion of local economic development and
employment creation;
• Viable network integration requirements;
• Ability and capacity to raise finance; and
• Short-commissioning time
The Uganda FIT-scheme includes detailed rules
of grid access:
• Both the national grid operator as well as distri-
bution grid companies are obliged to connect
green power generators to the transmission or
distribution grid; 
• The grid operator has to buy all green power
supplied without consideration of the power
demand (priority rule); 
• Renewable energy generators need to be
licensed; and
• Cost of grid connection shall be borne by the
renewable power supplier; whereas cost of grid
enhancement has to be borne by the grid com-
pany (Electricity Regulatory Authority, 2011/2).
Green power generators who intend to sell
power under the REFIT scheme need to be
licensed. They have to submit a Notice of
Application that serves the regulator (ERA) for the
initial pre-qualification of the projects. The Notice
shall include information about the following
aspects:
• ‘Contribution of the project to grid stabilisation
and reduction in network losses;
• Acceptance of the standardised Power Purchase
Agreement;
• Impacts on socio-economics to include econom-
ic development, employment creation and con-
tribution to national developmental goals and
objectives; 
• An indication of the location and technical spec-
ifications of the interconnection point with the
grid;
• Technical and financial requirements for net-
work integration’ (Electricity Regulatory Author-
ity, 2011/2:9).
What are the pros and cons of the Ugandan FIT
scheme from an investor’s perspective? 
Positive features are the following:
• FITs are provided for a comprehensive bundle of
renewable energies (not for specific technolo-
gies);
• FITs are expressed in US$;
• Attractive level of FITs for most technologies,
especially for wind and solar PV;
• The tariff  is offered for a period of 20 years;
• Explicit inflation indexing for the variable cost;
• Grid companies have the obligation to connect
renewable energy generators to the  transmis-
sion or distribution grid;
• Purchase obligation with explicit ‘priority rule’
for renewable energies; and
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Table 5: Feed-in-Tariffs up to a maximum capacity of twenty megawatts (20MW)
Technology Tariff O&M 2011 2012 2013 2014 Payment 
(US$/kWh) percentage (MW) (MW) (MW) (MW) period
(US$/kWh) (Years)
Hydro (9><=20 MW) 0.073 7.61 45 90 135 180 20
Hydro (1 >< = 8MW) Linear tariff 7.24 15 30 60 90 20
Hydro (500kW><=1 MW) 0.109 7.08 1 15 2 5 20
Biogases 0.081 22.65 20 50 75 100 20
Biomass 0.103 16.23 10 20 30 50 20
Biogas 0.115 19.23 10 20 30 50 20
Landfill gas 0.089 19.71 10 20 30 50 20
Geothermal 0.077 4.29 10 30 50 75 20
Solar PV 0.362 5.03 2 3 5 7.5 20
Wind 0.124 6.34 50 75 100 150 20
• Cost of grid enhancement has to be borne by
the grid company.
An unfavourable institutions feature of the
Ugandan FIT scheme that may lead to higher trans-
action cost or increasing uncertainty are the follow-
ing:
• Cost of grid connection shall being be borne by
the green power supplier;
• Low cumulative capacity limits, especially for
solar PV; and
• Renewable power generators need to provide
comprehensive information on project financ-
ing, and project impacts need to be approved by
the Regulator.
As mentioned, the Government of Uganda has
defined ambitious targets to increase the share of
modern renewable energies from 4% to 61% in
2017. The FIT-program shall play an important role
to increase the share of green power in the power
sector by attracting international investments. 
The Ugandan FIT scheme can be considered as
one of the most sophisticated schemes among all
African countries. Due to the challenging pre-quali-
fication process, there are some doubts whether the
61% target will be met. Up to now, there is no data
available on how many projects have been
approved under the FIT scheme. 
4. Conclusions
The main objective of FIT-programs in African
countries is to increase and diversify the power sup-
ply, preferably financed by international investors.
At the same time, significant increases of power
prices shall be avoided. To attract international
investors the FITs are generally based on the specif-
ic cost of the renewable energy technologies and
often expressed in US$. But there are exceptions
like Algeria where premiums on the power market
price are offered.
To avoid increasing power prices, Governments
of African countries with FIT-schemes apply a broad
bundle of different strategies. Here, one can distin-
guish explicit and implicit approaches. Explicit
approaches are institutions that are explicitly
designed to limit the program cost. They are clear-
cut and must be obeyed by the stakeholders like
project developers, grid companies and
Government authorities. Implicit approaches
involve features that are not clear-cut. The outcome
is subject to negotiations between the stakeholders.
Explicit approaches that are practiced by the
countries under consideration are the following:
• Program caps to limit the total share of renew-
able energies in the power sector and thus to
limit the additional cost for the customers;
• Technology caps to limit the share of technolo-
gies with comparatively high specific cost, some-
times called Priority 1 and Priority 2 technolo-
gies;
• Minimum sizes to exclude small plants with rela-
tively high specific cost;
• Different tariffs for firm power (non-fluctuating
power) and non-firm power. Higher tariffs for
firm power supply are economically justified
since firm power doesn’t involve an increase of
balancing power.
Examples of implicit approaches are:
• Tariffs are not only based on the cost of renew-
able power technologies, but have to consider
other aspects, too (like impacts on power
prices);
• Tariffs are maximum prices, not minimum
prices;
• PPAs are subject to negotiations between green
power producer and grid company;
• Unclear rules concerning grid extensions and
grid enhancement;
• Requirement of licensing or approval of  renew-
able energy producers or projects.
From an investor’s point of view, explicit and
implicit rules of program cost control will be judged
differently. Explicit rules are limiting program cost
by regulating (limiting) the number and size of pro-
jects. Especially, project size caps do not increase
the project risk and affect bankability. On the other
hand, if implicit rules like negotiable PPA or tariffs
are applied, the transaction cost will be rising and
the outcome of the process becomes uncertain. In
this case, the bankability of renewable energy pro-
jects is jeopardized, since banks unlikely finance
projects whose cost and timing is uncertain. Thus,
implicit rules of reducing program cost tend to
impede the attraction of international investors and
thus jeopardize the success of a FIT-program. South
Africa represents an example that a highly attractive
FIT scheme can become completely ineffective
when all relevant issues are left to negotiations
between green power suppliers and a grid compa-
ny.
As mentioned earlier, each instrument to pro-
mote renewable energy in the power sector has its
specific strengths and weaknesses, depending on
the targets of energy policy. Whereas, FITs are most
appropriate to develop new renewable energy tech-
nologies and to bring down the cost, quota systems
and competitive bidding seem to be superior to
increase the share of renewable energies at least
cost. Since stable power prices are of high political
priority all over Africa, there is no wonder that sev-
eral African countries with FIT schemes have intro-
duced elements of quotas or tendering:
• Ghana has introduced renewable energy pur-
chase obligations for distributers and bulk con-
sumers;
• Uganda has introduced an annual open bidding
Journal of Energy in Southern Africa  • Vol 24 No 1  •  February 2013 65
process for Priority 2 projects (projects with
comparatively high generation cost).
In 2011, South Africa has replaced its FIT
scheme with a comprehensive competitive bidding
process. The tendering approach enables the coun-
try to expand the share of renewable energies in the
power sector at relatively low cost and in accor-
dance to the National Resource Plan. The success
of the first bidding rounds shows that South Africa
is likely to avoid the implementation deficits of the
FIT scheme and to harmonize the conflicting targets
of expanding the share of renewables, affordable
power prices and grid stability. Namibia seems to be
the next country that is about to modify its FIT plans
in favour of competitive bidding for bigger projects:
All projects greater than 5 MW shall go under ten-
dering.7
Notes
1. This was due to possible conflict with the relevant
state procurement Act
2. System operation is assumed to be a function of the
grid company.
3. Another issue is ‘stranded cost’ of incumbent power
producer
4. Typically, the Master Plan combines political objec-
tives for the future dynamic of the power system with
economic considerations of the grid company and
power generators
5. The FIT scheme of Mauritius includes only one tech-
nology
6. In the ‘detailed proposal’ the investor has to publish a
business plan including information on project financ-
ing. As long as future revenues are questionable
banks will hesitate to make clear statements on the
share of debt that is acceptable to them
7. Namibia is introducing three schemes, FIT for small
renewables, less the 5W, tendering for large scale
(greater than MW) and net –metering for roof top PV.
Currently, Namibia plans a tender of 30 MW solar PV
(3 projects of 10 MW in different parts of the country)
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